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INTEREST ARBITRATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
ROBERT G. HOWLETT*
INTRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Prior to the 1950's, public employees had little interest in collective
bargaining. Job security and working conditions in the public sector
had, for many decades, been superior to those in the private sector.
Public sector labor organizations developed expertise in lobbying, fre-
quently with considerable success.'
Gradually, employees in the private sector, through their unions,
protective legislation, and employers who recognized (in order to avoid
unionization or otherwise) that adequate compensation and employee
benefits created a more productive work force, overcame the gap in
compensation, benefits, and job security. Public employees, noting the
change, began to develop an interest in collective action.
2
Another factor seldom mentioned (and which should be the sub-
ject of a PhD dissertation) is the desire of every individual to partici-
pate in decisions on subjects which affect him/her. My experience in
labor relations leads me to conclude that this desire to participate has
been a significant factor in public sector unionization.
Wisconsin was the first state to enact a public sector collective bar-
gaining statute. The 1959 recognition statute was implemented in 1961
through the adoption of a procedure administrated by the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission.3
* Counsel, Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett, Grand Rapids, Michigan; Member
and former chairman, Federal Service Impasses Panel; Member (1963) and Chairman (1964-76),
Michigan Employment Relations Commission.
1. There was earlier collective action in the public sector. During the administration of
President Andrew Jackson, federal employees, in common with private sector employees, after
"demonstrations" during which "employment ceased," gained a 10-hour work day. NESBITT,
LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE, 21 (1976). There was bargaining in
TVA, the U.S. Printing Office, Navy Shipyards, and in some areas of the Department of the
Interior.
2. Vogel, What About the Rights of the Public Employee?, 1 LAB. L.J. 604 (1950); Proceed-
ings Labor Relations Law Section, 1955 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. L. 90; Smith and McLaughlin, Public
Employment.: A Neglected Area of Research and Training in Labor Relations, 16 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 30 (1962); Weisenfeld, Public Employees-First or Second Class Citizens, 16 LAB. L.J.
685 (1965).
3. Wisconsin Employment Relations Act, Wis. STAT. ANN. Ch. 509 (West 1959). Although
Wisconsin is generally credited with having the first public employment relations act, as a resident
of Michigan, I am impelled to point out that in 1947 the Hutchinson Act was enacted. It provided
that the majority of any "given group" of public employees could petition the Michigan Labor
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In 1962 President John Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988,
which granted limited collective bargaining rights to federal employees.
In 1965 four states (Delaware, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Michi-
gan) enacted public employment relations acts.4 The action in the first
five states was followed by public employment relations acts which now
exist in 39 states and the District of Columbia.5 In addition, several
cities have provided for collective bargaining by ordinance or charter.
Most state statutes track the National Labor Relations Act on the
scope of bargaining, although some place limitations on wages, hours,
or other working conditions, and a few add areas of bargaining. A
majority of the statutes provide for mediation and fact finding, the lat-
ter being the terminal procedure for the resolution of collective bar-
gaining impasses in most bargaining situations.6
THE STRIKE PROHIBITION
Prior to enactment of public sector collective bargaining legisla-
tion, the states had one opinion in common-at least, those states
which addressed the subject: public employees had no right to strike.
It was illegal to strike against the sovereign-whether the sovereign be
king or people. The strike prohibitions were enunciated either in stat-
utes or in court decisions. 7 The United States Supreme Court, by denial
Mediation Board (now the Michigan Employment Relations Commission) for the mediation of
"grievances." In 1949 the Commission was authorized to engage in fact finding and issue "written
findings," which, while "not binding upon the parties," were "made public." MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 423.207) (1949). In 1959 the Michigan Supreme Court in Garden City School District v.
Labor Mediation Board, 358 Mich. 258, 263, 99 N.W.2d 485, 488 declared, "We know of no
grievance more likely to provoke the sort of dispute which the Labor Mediation Board and [the
statute] are designed to avoid than those concerning wages and salary." The result of this was
collective bargaining in some Michigan cities, counties, and school districts.
4. 1965 Conn. Pub. Acts 159; 1965 Delaware H.B. 249; 1965 Mass. Acts Ch. 564 & Ch. 763;
MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.201-216 (West 1965).
5. The statutes range from Kentucky, which covers police in one county and fire fighters in
one city, and Texas, which has a statute authorizing cities to adopt collective bargaining for police
and fire fighters, to states which have statutes similar to the coverage of private sector employees
under the National Labor Relations Act, e.g., New York, Ohio, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and
Washington.
6. In several states, e.g., Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon, fact finding is the
terminal procedure for impasse resolution for most employees, but others are subject to mandated
arbitration. See Simkin, Fact-Finding: Its Values and Limitations, PROC. TWENTY-THIRD ANN.
MEETING NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 165 (1971).
7. SeeHowlett, The Right to Strike in the Public Sector, 53 CHI. B. REC, 108 (1971), reprinted
in, 7 INT'L Soc'Y BARRISTERS DIRECTORY, No. 456 (1971) and [1971] LABOR RELATIONS YEAR-
BOOK 98; HANSLOWE, THE KING CAN Do No WRONG, THE EMERGING LAW OF LABOR RELA-
TIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, Ch. 2 (1967); STERRETT AND ABOUD, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT (2d ed., rev. 1982); Burton and Krider, The Role and Consequences of
Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970); Wellington and Winter, More on Strikes by
Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 441 (1970); Shaw and Clark, Public Sector Strikes. An Empirical
Analysis, 2 J.L. EDUC. 217 (1973).
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of review in two cases, has refused to upset decisions which hold that
public employees do not have a constitutional right to strike. 8
One theory to support the strike prohibition in the public sector is
that services performed by public employees are essential services.
Analysis of this theory discloses its limited persuasiveness. There is
little damage to the public from a strike by library workers, recreation
employees, or highway workers in Michigan's Upper Peninsula during
July. A strike by railroad employees may have a serious impact on the
economy, as may a strike by airline employees. Prior to technological
improvements which have rendered it possible for supervisors to sup-
plant bargaining unit employees, a strike by public utility employees
had a serious impact on people, as did a strike by mine workers prior to
the increased use of gas and oil.
The flaw in the "essentiality" theory is illustrated by the fact that
there are public hospitals and private hospitals, publicly owned utilities
and privately owned utilities, public schools and private schools, pub-
licly operated garbage and trash pickup trucks and privately operated
garbage and trash pickup trucks. Private employees have the right to
strike. Striking public employees have no greater impact on the econ-
omy, property, or peoples' living than private employees.
INTEREST ARBITRATION-SUBSTITUTE FOR STRIKE
In spite of the dubious dichotomy advanced by strike opponents
(and opponents of public sector collective bargaining) in the public sec-
tor, a strike by some public employees has the potential to cause human
hardship, damage to property, and loss of life. Police departments and
fire departments are obvious examples.
Interest arbitration, is a dispute resolving process which is not un-
known in the private sector. It is a procedure which has been used in
the transit and newspaper industries.9 Several states attempted to man-
8. Anderson Fed'n of Teachers, Local 519 v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 254
N.E.2d 329, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970); United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F.
Supp. 879 (D. D.C.), cert. denie, 404 U.S. 802 (1971). However, the Supreme Court of Montana
has held that the right to collective bargaining includes the right to strike. Montana v. Public
Employees Craft Council, 165 Mt. 349, 529 P.2d 785 (1974).
9. Young, Arbitration of Termsfor New Labor Contracts, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1302
(1966); Kuhn, Arbitration in Transit, UNIV. OF PENN. PRESS (1952); Barnham, From Private to
Public. Labor Relations in Urban Transit, 25 INDUs. R. LAB. REL. REV. 95 (1971); Platt, Arbitra-
tion of Interest Disputes in Local Transit and Newspaper Publishing Industries, ARB. INTEREST DIS-
PUTES PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 8 (1974). As long ago as the 1880's, the Knights of Labor and
employers developed a type of interest arbitration. SLICHTER, HEALY, LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 742 (1960). But apparently, the "strong" local
unions of the Knights of Labor were not interested in arbitration. COMMONS, HISTORY OF LA-
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date interest arbitration for public utilities.' 0 This experiment, which
operated with considerable success, came to a screeching halt when the
United States Supreme Court decided in the Wisconsin Bus Company
case that the Wisconsin statute was preempted by the National Labor
Relations Act."
Because a strike by employees performing essential services has
the potential for serious damage to people and property,-neutrals,
union representatives, government officials, and a few employers have
proposed interest arbitration as an appropriate substitute for the
strike. 12 It is surprising that the first state public sector interest arbitra-
tion statute was in Wyoming. The statute, applicable to fire fighters,
was enacted in 1965.13
BOUR IN THE UNITED STATES, 374 (1946). It has been used in emergencies, e.g., the Anthracite
Coal Strike of 1902. PERLMAN, A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 176
(1922). See generally NORTHRUP, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND GOVERNMENT INTERVEN-
TION IN LABOR DISPUTES (1966); TROTTA, ARBITRATION OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES
149 el seq. (1974); Miller, Interest Arbitration in the Private Sector, 1982 PROC. TENTH ANN. CONF.
SOC'Y PROF. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 136 (1982).
10. Roberts, Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes in Public Utilities, I LAB. L.J. 694
(1950).
1 1. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees of America v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (195 1). The dissent of Justices Frankfurter, Bur-
ton, and Minton makes sense; the majority opinion does not. If the three dissenters had prevailed,
labor relations in the public utilities would have been improved substantially. See also Grand
Rapids City Coach Lines v. Howlett, 137 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Mich 1955), which held that a
Michigan statute which provided for fact finding rather than arbitration (as the Wisconsin statute
did) was preempted by federal law on the basis of the Wisconsin Bus Company decision. See also
Division 1287, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri,
374 U.S. 74, reh. denied, 375 U.S. 870 (1963), which held that a Missouri statute which authorized
the seizure of public utilities had been preempted by federal statute.
12. McAvoy, Binding Arbitration for Contract Terms: .4 New Approach to the Resolution of
Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1192 (1972); ZACK, IMPASSES, STRIKES, RESOLU-
TIONS, PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUBLIC UNIONS 101 (1972); Wollett, Some Facts and Fantasies
About Public Employee Bargaining, PROC. 1971 JOINT ALMA-NASALRA CONF: THE ROLE OF THE
NEUTRAL IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISPUTES 70 (1972); Gould, Public Employment.- Mediation, Fact
Finding andArbitraton, 55 A.B.A.J. 835 (1969); Bernstein, 41ternatives to the Strike in Public Labor
Relations, 85 HAR. L. REV. 459 (1971), reprinted in, AAUP BULLETIN (Winter 1972); Wurf, From
Confrontation to Cooperation (a speech delivered at the Secretary of Labor's Conference on States
and Local Relations), reprinted in, 429 GERR F-I (1971) (Wurf changed his mind. Previously he
opposed it. 248 GERR D-I (1968)); Anderson, Compulsory Arbitration Under State Statutes,
PROC. N.Y.U. 22ND ANN. CONF. LAB. 259 (1970); Wellington and Winter, Structuring Collective
Bargaining in Public Employment, 79 YALE L. REV. 805 (1970); Anderson, Strikes and Impasse
Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 943 (1969), (the March, 1969 issue of Michi-
gan Law Review is devoted to labor relations in the public sector, and consists of nine excellent
articles). Even the 1970 report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernment Relations cau-
tiously suggested binding arbitration. The report said, "[Tihe commission believes strongly that
the realities of the 1970's dictates the availability of binding arbitration if the local employer
wishes to make use of this option in order to avoid strikes." (GERR Ref. File 51:101, 116).
13. WYO. STAT. § 27-10-101 (1977).
INTEREST ARBITR4TION
THE FIRST INTEREST ARBITRATION STATUTES
The early statutes were limited to the uniformed forces; later stat-
utes extended interest arbitration to employees performing the more
essential services. Currently 25 states (plus the City of New York and
other municipalities) have statutes either mandating or permitting the
arbitration of collective bargaining impasses. 14
LEGAL STRIKES
In the meantime, some states, departing from the "no strike
against the sovereign" philosophy, have authorized strikes, with limita-
tions, by some public employees.' 5
Limitations on strikes are not confined to the public sector. Sec-
tion 206 of the Labor-Management Relations Act' 6 and the limitations
included in the Railway Labor Act' 7 are examples. As indeed, are the
prohibitions against specified strikes under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.18
In addition, strikes may be enjoined under the Boys Market doc-
trine,' 9 and strikes in breach of contract may result in successful actions
for damages.20
14. Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1984); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-473c
(1965); Delaware: DEL.CODE ANN. Tit. 19, § 1310 (1979); Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT § 389-11
(1976); Illinois: ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1614 (Supp. 1983); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-
1-13(c) (West 1979); Iowa: IOWA CODE § 20.22 (1981); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 26,
§§ 965, 1026 (Supp. 1983); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 150 E § 9 (West 1982);
Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.231 etseq. (1970); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.69,
179.72 (West Supp. 1983); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-310; §§ 39-34-101 to 39-34-106
(1983); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 288.201 to 288.205 (1981) (panel decides whether fact find-
ing recommendations shall be binding), § 3288.215; Nevada: Nevada REV. STAT. 288.201 to
288.205; New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-7; §§ 34:13A-14 to 34:13A-21 (West 1965 and
1984-85 Supp.); New York: N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(4) (McKinney 1983); Ohio: OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1417.14(D)(1) (1983 Supp.); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 11, § 51-104 (West
1983-84 Supp.) (binding on labor organization; municipality may reject); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 243, 736-243.762 (1971); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 43, § 217.4 (Purdon, 1984-85
Supp.); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-9.1-7 to 28-9-11, 29-9.2-7 to 29-9.2-11, 29-9.3-10 to
28-9.3-15, 28-9.4-10 to 28-9.4-15, and 36-11-9 (1980); Texas: TEX. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN. Art.
5154c §§ 9 to 16 (Vernon 1971-83 Supp.); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 21, § 1733 (1984 Supp.);
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.56.430 to 41.56.490 (1972 and Supp.); Wisconsin: Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 11 1.70(4)(c)(5)(6), 11l.70(4)(j)-(m), 111.77 and 111.85 to 111.86 (West 1974 and
1984-85 Supp.); Wyoming: WYO. STAT. §§ 27-10-105 to 27-10-107 (1977).
15. Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1970).
17. 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970). (Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act).
19. Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 1770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
20. E.g., Benton Harbor Malleable Indus. v. UAW, 355 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1966); Int'l Union of
Operating Engineers v. Metropolitan-Gill-Tecon, 400 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1968); National
Rejectors Indus. v. United Steelworkers of America, 562 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub.
noma., United Steelworkers of America v. Nat'l Rejectors Indus. 435 U.S. 923 (1977).
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THE INTRODUCTION OF INTEREST ARBITRATION
Most public officials who have spoken on the subject oppose inter-
est arbitration.21 This paper is concerned primarily with interest arbi-
tration mandated by a legislature. Such an impasse resolving
procedure is generally called "compulsory" arbitration. I think the
term "mandated arbitration," or "legislated arbitration" is preferable.
The term "compulsory" excites emotions. Perhaps the adjective was
first used by opponents of interest arbitration with the hope it might
help it to be rejected. Generally opponents of legislated arbitration do
not oppose the use of interest arbitration, if chosen voluntarily by pub-
lic employer and public sector union.
ARGUMENTS: CON AND PRO
The arguments against mandated arbitration are:
(1) It is an unconstitutional delegation of legislated authority;
(2) It damages collective bargaining, because parties fail to
bargain;
(3) It is not effective, because there is no practical way to en-
force compliance, i.e., employees may go on strike;
(4) It may result in administrative awards of high wages;
(5) It works to the advantage of weak unions;
(6) Outside third parties who are unfamiliar with the practical-
ities of the enterprise write the contract;22 and
(7) It does not encourage cooperation, which is the essential
aspect of on-going employment relations, but rather, it pushes the
parties further apart.23
The arguments in favor of mandated arbitration are:
21. Mayor Coleman A. Young of Detroit, Michigan, on December 4, 1979, delivered a vigor-
ous attack on interest arbitration before a legislative forum on "New Directions for Public Em-
ployee Labor Relations" (manuscript). Mayor Young, as State Senator Young, was one of the
sponsors of the Michigan Police/Fire Fighter Arbitration Act, commonly known as Act 312. The
author of this paper was one of the two arbitrators who were the subject of Major Young's dia-
tribe. Among other things, he said, "This is why we are appealing these awards (two police cases
and one fire fighter case), asking the courts to save us from these maniacs." For a choleric attack
on interest arbitration as well as public sector collective bargaining, see Petro, Compulsory Public
Sector Bargaining andArbitration in the Courts, 3 GOV'T UNION REV. 3 (Summer 1982).
22. The same argument was heard from employers and some unions opposed to grievance
arbitration during past years. "[N]o outsider" should be "allowed to dictate a grievance decision."
SCHLECTER, HEALEY AND LIVERNASH supra note 9 at 749-50; WATKINS AND DODD, LABOR
PROBLEMS 852 (3d ed. 1940).
23. An argument was made in some states that mandatory arbitration violated constitutional
Home Rule provisions. The New York Court of Appeals held there was no violation in City of
Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290 (1975). Seeparticulariy the concurring opin-
ion of Judge Fuchsberg. The Colorado Supreme Court held to the contrary under the language of
the Home Rule provision in the state constitution: Greeley Police Union v. City Council of Gree-
ley, 191 Colo. 419, 553 P.2d 790 (1976).
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(1) When strikes are prohibited, the states must provide a sub-
stitute for resolving impasses;
(2) It is essential that there be no work stoppages in services
endangering the health and safety of the public; and
(3) It is a civilized method of dispute resolution.24
The unconstitutional argument is that arbitration changes repre-
sentative democracy, because it removes from the legislature the deter-
mination of government employees' compensation and working
conditions. Legislators, the argument goes, are elected to decide polit-
ical and policy issues which include the establishment of working con-
ditions for government employees. Legislators represent all their
constituents, including public employees.
The Report of the Task Force on State and Local Government
Relations, summarizing the first two objections, states that,
"[G]overnment bodies cannot lawfully delegate legislative responsibil-
ity to outsiders. . . . [Uinder compulsory arbitration negotiators will
develop a strategy for presenting and holding to extreme positions be-
cause they are aware that all unresolved disputes will ultimately be
presented to third parties. '25
Arbitration can change representative government. Indeed, it
does. It may result in a redistribution of government resources, change
managerial authority, affect the cost of government, influence the
amount of taxes required to operate government, impact on the quan-
tity and quality of government public service, and allow government
executives and legislators to escape responsibility for acts which they
normally and should perform.
But if a legislature finds that the arbitration process is in the public
interest, should there be objection to interest arbitration?
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTES
Most of the courts which have faced the constitutional question
have upheld the constitutionality of the statutes.26 The courts which
24. Arguments, pro and con, are set out in Roberts, Compulsory Arbitration, Panacea or Mill-
stone? IND. RLT. CTR. UNIV. OF HAWAII (1967). See also Anderson, The Impact ofPublic Sector
Bargaining, Wis. L. REV. 986 (1973); Howlett, Arbitration in the Public Sector, PRO. OF THE SW
LEGAL FOUND. 15TH ANN. INST. ON LAB. LAW 231 (1969); Anderson supra note 12. The Decem-
ber 1982 issue of Arbitration Journal includes six interesting articles on public sector interest
arbitration.
25. [1967] Report of the Task Force on State and Local Government Labor Relations (prepared
for) THE 1967 NATIONAL GOVERNORS CONFERENCE 24.
26. Wyoming v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (1968); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular
Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560
(1969); City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973); City of Spokane
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have upheld the constitutionality of interest arbitration statutes have
answered the legal attacks that have been made on the statutes. The
primary opposition argument is that granting authority to an arbitrator
or arbitration panel, delegates legislative power to a third party not
responsive to the public, which is contrary to the state constitution. An
answer to this contention was well stated in the concurring opinion of
New York Court of Appeals Judge Fuchsberg:
It is settled law that a delegation of power by the legislature to a
subordinate body is constitutional, provided it is accompanied by
sufficiently specific standards for its use and provided that the dele-
gation is of power to carry out law, not power to make law ...
In several (cited) cases, the courts have held that the delegation
is of legislative power but that it is, nevertheless, permissible because
the arbitration panel in performing a public function, becomes a
public body ...
I do not find it useful to try to determine with precision whether
the particular delegation of power made here is most accurately clas-
sified as legislative, judicial, or administrative. . . . [W]hen courts
in the past have upheld or invalidated delegations of power, they
have most frequently done so by first determining whether the dele-
gation had a rational purpose and adequate safeguards, and only
then have they applied the labels "legislative" or "administrative"-
and we might add "judicial"-to the results of their assessments.
v. Spokane Police Guild, 87 Wash. 2d 457, 553 P.2d 1316 (1976); Town of Arlington v. Board of
Conciliation and Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976) (the Massachusetts statute was
repealed in a referendum vote); City of Richfield v. Local No. 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters,
276 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1979); City of Bangor v. Bangor Educ. Ass'n, 433 A.2d 383 (Me. 1981);
City of Amsterdam, supra note 23; Medford Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Medford, 40 Or. App.
519, 595 P.2d 1268 (1979); Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Mercer County Improve-
ment Auth., 76 N.J. 245, 386 A.2d 1290 (1978); City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 408
Mich. 410, 294 N.W.2d 68 (1980); Milwaukee County v. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, AFSCME,
109 Wis. 2d 14, 325 N.W.2d 350 (1982); Newark Firemen's Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Local 4 v. City
of Newark, 90 N.J. 44, 447 A.2d 130 (1982). Franklin County Prison Bd. v. Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Bd., 491 Pa. 50, 417 A.2d 1138 (1980), involved the statute applicable to prison guards.
Under the statute, panel decisions on economic issues are advisory only. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court said that if a legislative body rejected an award of a financial subject, the only
remedy was to amend the constitution (as occurred in the case of police and fire fighters) or
through the political process. The Supreme Court of South Dakota in City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux
Falls Fire Fighters Local 814, 89 S. Dakota 455, 234 N.W.2d 35 (1975), held that the Police/Fire
Fighter Arbitration Act constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative power contrary to a pro-
vision of the South Dakota constitution, which was identical to a provision in the Pennsylvania
constitution under which a Pennsylvania statute had been found to be unconstitutional. The
Pennsylvania constitution was amended to affirmatively authorize legislation to provide for the
arbitration of collective bargaining impasses. See also Greeley Police Union, supra note 23. In
1955, the Supreme Court of Washington in Everett Fire Fighters Local No. 350 v. Johnson, 46
Wash. 2d 114, 278 P.2d 662 (1955), held that an amendment to a city charter adopted by the
initiative procedure providing for interest arbitration was an unconstitutional delegation of the
city council's legislative authority. The City of Everett voters were ahead of their time; the 1955
Supreme Court had not become modem. See 69 A.L.R. 3d 885.
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The case before us is a good example. Disputes between cities
and their uniformed services generate an infinity of special circum-
stances and facts. No legislature could devise a law which would deal
fairly with every issue which could arise in a specific dispute. In-
stead, the legislature has chosen to create a new way to handle such
disputes by delegating powers which may be partly legislative, partly
judicial, and partly administrative; they may even be described as sui
generis.27 (emphasis in text)
The cases upholding the constitutionality of interest arbitration
statutes have enunciated a similar principle. Some courts have stressed
the standards established by the legislature.28
What of the charge that interest arbitration damages collective
bargaining? The opinion of those experienced in the process who are
not public management oriented is that damage to the collective bar-
gaining process has been small.29
It was my observation during 1969-76 when I administered the
Michigan statute, that its adverse impact on collective bargaining was
minimal.30 In Detroit there were problems with police and fire fighter
bargaining, but I am reasonably certain that they would have been
present without Act 312.
The argument that interest arbitration may not be effective be-
cause there is no practical procedure to enforce compliance and that
therefore, employees may strike-appears to be a theory without evi-
dentiary support. In Michigan, during the first year after the statute's
enactment, there was one strike related to an award, which was due to a
misunderstanding by the police officers in the City of Marquette who
were involved in the second award under the statute. Since 1969 there
has been one job action due to a delay in an award. A few other job
actions, such as the slowdown in Detroit because of the reorganization
of the police department, have not been related to the statute. The
eleven replies from the several state agencies to which I wrote, all re-
ported that job action has not been a problem.
One would be naive to assert that there never would be collective
27. City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 297-98 (1975).
28. City of Warren; Harney, Div. 540, Amalgamated Transit Union; Medford Fire Fighters
Ass'n City of Richfield; and City of Detroit, supra note 26.
29. REHMUS, THE MICHIGAN ARBITRATION EXPERIENCE, FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION 37, et
seq. (1975); Benjamin, Final Offer Arbitration Awards in Michigan 1973-1977, 3 MICH. PROF.
FIREFIGHTER nos. 3 and 4 (Autumn 1978, Winter 1979); BOWERS, A STUDY OF ARBITRATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICES IN MICHIGAN AND PENNSYLVANIA,
170 et seq. (1973) (unpublished PhD thesis at Cornell Univ., N.Y.). The Michigan Employment
Relations Commission also made a study in which it reached the same conclusion.
30. See Howlett, Contract Negotiation Arbitration in the Public Sector, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 47,
57 (1973).
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action by employees. If employees feel sufficiently frustrated, they will
make that frustration known, e.g., employees in Poland.
Generally, employees in the categories covered by interest arbitra-
tion statutes have been ready for this "civilized" process; hence, there is
no significant interest in using collective action against an award with
which employees may not agree.
Some years ago there was a bill before the Michigan Legislature
which provided for interest arbitration for school employees. The
newspapers reported my statement before the House of Representatives
Labor Committee correctly when they stated that the MERC chairman
offered "mild" support for the bill. I stated that while I approved of the
concept of interest arbitration, I was not sure that school employees
were ready for it, and that if there were strikes against disliked awards,
the arbitration process would be damaged-and that would be unfortu-
nate for its future use.
IMPACT ON SALARIES AND WAGES
Have arbitration awards provided for "high wages"?
While municipal officials have, from time to time, charged that
arbitration awards of compensation are higher than negotiated settle-
ments, there appears to be no study which discloses a significant vari-
ance. Professor Ernst Benjamin of Wayne State University in his
"Final-Offer Arbitration Awards in Michigan 1973-1977" concludes,
"[I]t seems a reasonable inference from the available data that arbitra-
tion awards average no more than one or two percentage points more
per year than negotiated settlements. But a precise estimate must wait
improved data on both negotiated and arbitrated salaries."'' a
Because comparability is the primary factor or guideline used by
arbitrators in determining compensation for employees, it is reasonable
to believe that both negotiated compensation and awarded compensa-
tion will be considered by arbitrators in reaching a decision. Compen-
sation awarded in a neighboring city does have an effect on
negotiations. Such data as is available, does not support the contention
that arbitrators' awards result in "high wages."
There is also no study which I have been able to find to support
the contention that a public sector interest arbitration statute works to
31. Benjamin, supra note 29. That interest arbitration has not resulted in excessively high
wages during the early years of the statute is the opinion of the authors in Final-Offer Arbitration,
supra note 29, in which Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin experiences are reviewed.
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the advantage of weak unions.32 It is reasonable to believe, however,
that some unions may hope to gain more from arbitration than from
negotiations. However, the fact that uniformed employees and "essen-
tial" employees subject to arbitration statutes have not used the strike
weapon (illegal in all states), suggests that whether a union is "strong"
or "weak" is a minimal factor, if a factor at all, in the use of the statu-
tory arbitration process.
On the other hand, Herman Torosian, Chairman of the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission, says, "In terms of balancing
power, especially in smaller cities and school districts, the law has been
successful. '33
The experience of PATCO demonstrates that when there is a gov-
ernment dedicated to enforcing the "no strike" provisions of the law,
the so-called strength of the union is a non sequitur.
I do not imply that some unions may not be more effective in
presenting cases to arbitrators and arbitration panels than other unions.
Indeed, I have had enough cases to note a significant difference in the
presentations, but I am not sure, from my experience, that the quality
of the presentation has in fact, made a difference in the final award.
COOPERATION--OR LACK OF IT
I know of no study to support the contention that interest arbitra-
tion does not encourage cooperation. I have seen no evidence of this.
Indeed, if one considers arbitration vis-a-vis strike, it would appear
that arbitration is a far more cooperative venture than a strike (or a
lockout).
Arvid Anderson, Chairman of the Office of Collective Bargaining
of the City of New York, concludes that interest arbitration is not "an
arms length adjudicatory process," but "is a process of adjustment and
accommodation. '34
ALLEGED DAMAGE To COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The "damage" to collective bargaining has often occurred in cities
where the political atmosphere is such that city administrators, and
sometimes union officials, would rather have an arbitrator render a de-
cision than "bite the bullet." It affords the mayor the opportunity to
32. But see Watkins and Dodd, supra note 22 at 851, and Serrin, Jersey Arbitration Law. Why
Unions Tend to Win, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1983.
33. Letter dated March 8, 1984, to the author.
34. Anderson, Arbitration and the Law. "A Better Way," 30 LAB. LAW J. 259, 262 (1979).
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demand that the legislature provide him with the money to fund the
"unwanted" and "expensive" award.
There are also instances where the parties lack experience in col-
lective bargaining, but this factor is not confined to Police/Fire Fighter
Arbitration Act situations.
On a number of occasions, I refused to appoint a panel chairman
(thereby probably violating the statute) and directed that the parties
return to the bargaining table with a state mediator. This resulted in
some settlements and, in other cases, reduced the number of issues.
DECISION BY A THIRD PARTY
What of the charge that outside third parties unfamiliar with the
practicalities of the unit of government write the contract? In every case
before a trial court (whether judge alone or with jury), an outside party,
i.e., judge or jury, renders decisions involving private and public enter-
prises which have significant economic and policy impacts on the par-
ties before the decision maker. Judges and juries are unfamiliar with
the "practicalities" of almost every litigant in front of them. With com-
petent counsel who present evidence and argument, judges and juries
are able to render decisions which have been reasonably satisfactory to
the public since our Anglo/American jurisprudence began.35
Is there a difference between court proceedings and interest arbi-
tration proceedings? The answer is obviously "no." If the arbitrator or
arbitration panel is educated by counsel, as circuit judges and juries
are, the "third party" need not be "unfamiliar with the practicalities of
the unit of government (and union) involved."
THE IMPORTANCE OF MEDIATION
A factor in the successful operation of the Michigan Police/Fire
Fighter Arbitration Act (as well as the Public Employment Relations
Act) is the high competence of Michigan mediators.3 6
TYPES OF ARBITRATION
The states have experimented with several types of arbitration:
Tripartite panels;
Single arbitrators appointed by the parties;
35. I recognize that centuries ago, jurors were partisans chosen to support the litigator's
cause. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 115 (5th ed. 1956).
36. Some states depend on the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service for performance
of the mediation function. This is an abdication of state responsibility.
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Single arbitrators appointed by an administrative agency;
Conventional arbitration, i.e., the arbitrator or panel is not lim-
ited to the positions of the parties;
Last offer with the panel or arbitrator required to adopt a propo-
sal of one of the parties on all issues (package v package);
Last offer on each issue separately (issue v issue);
Last offer on economic issues with other issues subject to con-
ventional arbitration;
Last offer issue by issue on noneconomic issues and package v
package on economic issues;
Two last offers;
Last offers of the parties and the fact finder's recommendations;
and
Such procedure as the parties may adopt.
Nebraska has a state commission consisting of five "judges" ap-
pointed by the governor. In Nevada there is a fact finder, then a three-
member panel decides whether the fact finder's recommendations will
be binding.
Several of the states have alternate procedures, generally at the
election of the parties, with a specified procedure mandated if the par-
ties fail to agree.
"LAST OFFER" ARBITRATION
The theory of "last offer" is that the parties will move more closely
together in bargaining, thus increasing settlements. Does it serve this
purpose?37
The only persuasive statistics are in Michigan, which has experi-
ence with both conventional and last offer arbitration. Based on this
experience, the answer to the question is "yes."
Professor Peter Feuille agrees. He said, "Michigan is the first (and
only) jurisdiction. . . where we can compare arbitration experience on
a before and after basis ... [tlhe Michigan procedure seems to be
quite successful in inducing compliance. ' ' 38
When the Michigan Police/Fire Fighter Arbitration Act became
effective on October 1, 1969, it provided for conventional arbitration.
Effective January 1, 1973, the Michigan Legislature instituted last offer
arbitration for economic issues, each issue to be submitted separately to
the panel. During the first three years of Act 312 under conventional
37. REHMUS, supra note 29; BOWERS, supra note 29; LOWENBERG, THE PENNSYLVANIA ARBI-
TRATION EXPERIENCE, FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION (1975).
38. FEUILLE, FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION 21 (1975).
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arbitration, 176 petitions for arbitration were filed. 39 During these
three years, 71 cases were settled during the arbitration process without
an award. During the next three years, under last offer arbitration,
there were 172 petitions and 126 settlements. 40 Surprising to me was
that last offer arbitration did not reduce the number of impasses sub-
mitted to arbitration; these remained about the same.
Settlements in Michigan under last offer are continuing to be satis-
factory. The 1979-82 record follows:
Settled During
Process (by the
parties or with
Petitions assistance of Awards
Year Filed mediation) Issued
1979 92 68 24
1980 99 61 27
1981 83 57 24
1982 106 55 28
Data from other states discloses that the settlement rate varies.
Thus, in Iowa, 53 percent of the impasses are settled after lists of arbi-
trators have been forwarded to the parties and before an award is
issued.4 1
The chairman of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Board
reports that as a percentage of all negotiations, the number of awards
issued during 1976-83 range from a low of 4.5 percent to a high of 7.1
percent.
In Minnesota, the record for 1973 to 1983, inclusive, discloses that
under 30 percent of the cases certified to impasse are resolved before an
award.
In Minnesota the parties may agree on last offer arbitration either
as a package or issue by issue; otherwise, there is conventional arbitra-
tion. The fewer settlements in Minnesota as compared with Michigan
39. Professor Ernst Benjamin of Wayne State University in Final Offer Arbitration Award in
Michigan 1973-1977, supra note 29, states that there were 176 petitions filed between December 16,
1969, the date of the first petition, and December 31, 1972, the date that conventional arbitration
ended. One hundred eighty-four petitions were filed, but I dismissed eight for lack of jurisdic-
tion-the employers were not covered by the statute.
40. See Howlett, New Contract Arbitration in the Public Sector: The Michigan Example, ARB.
IN PRAc. 23 (1984).
41. In Iowa, parties are authorized to adopt their own procedures; hence, it is probable that
there are some arbitrators appointed by the parties without clearing through the Iowa Public Em-
ployment Relations Board.
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may support the theory that the last offer requirement in Michigan has
resulted in more settlements.
THE EFFECT OF INTEREST ARBITRATION IN THE STATES
I wrote to several state agency representatives prior to the prepara-
tion of this paper. I asked for their opinions on the success of interest
arbitration in their states. The replies which addressed my questions
follow.
MONTANA: "The interest arbitration process has worked well in
Montana. . . . I don't feel it has damaged collective bargaining in any
way."
NEBRASKA: "[T]he Commission has had a 27 percent settle-
ment rate in the past two years and Nebraska has had no public strikes
except for a one-day strike not sanctioned by the union (in 1975)."
HAWAII: "The arbitration process has worked in that settlements
have been reached without the withholding of services."
IOWA: "No strikes, few arbitrations."
NEW JERSEY:
For the most part, we have had very few aberrational awards
and the conservative nature of the interest arbitration process has
resulted in near comparability of interest arbitration awards and vol-
untary settlements. The acceptability of the process has been further
enhanced by the fact that police and fire interest arbitration awards
and the voluntary settlement have been equivalent to or less than
settlements in public education.42
WASHINGTON: Although the process "was working rather
badly prior to the 1979 amendments" when "interest arbitration was a
complete re-hash of the fact finding exercise," since the 1979 amend-
ments, "we have been somewhat more effective in mediation. (Hence),
I would have to give our current process pretty good marks."
OREGON: "The process has worked well in Oregon."
MAINE: "Since it is a relative rarity for interest cases to proceed
all the way to interest arbitration .... we consider that the current
processes have been successful."
MICHIGAN: "On the whole, it is my opinion that the last offer
process has somewhat distorted the final settlements, but the 'issue by
issue' approach still permits the arbitrator some room to fashion his
42. Robert M. Glasson, Director of the Public Employment Relations Commission, com-
mented on the "time-consuming" process and the cost of the process. This appears to be indige-
nous to the process. I was concerned about it when I administered the Michigan statute; it has
concerned me in every case in which I have served as panel chairman.
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own recommendations. ' 43
WISCONSIN:
[T]he procedure itself has not presented any significant
problems .... In terms of balancing the bargaining power, espe-
cially in smaller cities and school districts, the law has been success-
ful. . . . I would conclude that last offer binding arbitration, while
maybe not damaging collective bargaining, has definitely impacted
collective bargaining. Collective bargaining has changed. Whereas
before paries relied on strategy, tactics, and the willingness to devote
as much time as necessary in reaching a settlement . . ., now the
parties tend to meet once with the investigator (who attempts to me-
diate the dispute),at which time they are inclined to direct their atten-
tion to comparables and argue about the same, knowing they have
the right to go to arbitration.
"PACKAGE V PACKAGE" OR "ISSUE V ISSUE"
Professor Peter Feuille and his colleague Gary Long argue that
package v package is superior to issue v issue as a means of forcing
settlement:
There have been two noticable impacts of the entire package
selection requirement. First, it forces each party to be "reasonable"
with each proposal on each issue ...
Second, entire package selection prevents arbitrators from im-
posing their version of desirable compromises upon the parties in
multi-issue disputes, a freedom they would appear to have under is-
sue-by-issue selection."
Professors Gerhart and Drotning of Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity also aver that in the package offer systems, "there is (or should
be) a maximum pressure on the parties to resolve their dispute short of
the arbitration process." They further state that:
The major impact of final-offer-arbitration-by-package in Wisconsin
appears to be the reduction in the number of issues submitted to ar-
bitration. That is, the parties are much less likely to insert "bogus
issues" into the final offer package. 45
However, Gerhart and Drotning criticize last offer arbitration:
There are certain advantages to conventional arbitration, or dis-
advantages to final-offer arbitration, which make the former prefera-
43. I did not observe that last offer had "distorted" final settlements during the three years I
administered the statute under last offer. However, in two Michigan cases in which I served, this
could have been true, but I was able to persuade my panel colleagues to waive the last offer
requirement; we issued unanimous awards.
44. Feuille and Long, The Public Adminixtrator and Final Offer Arbitration, PUB. AD. REV.
575, 578 (Nov/Dec 1974).
45. Gerhart and Drotning, A Six State Study ofImpasse Procedures in the Public Sector,
CASE W. RES. 165-66 (Sept. 1980).
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ble. One of these is the importance of "acceptability" as a criterion
for arbitrator decisions. Potentially, the "last-offers" of both parties
may be totally unacceptable to the opponent.46
Gerhart and Drotning then somewhat inconsistently state, "Our
general conclusion with respect to the use of final offer arbitration is
that the particular type of arbitration has little impact on its utilization
or likelihood of earlier bilateral settlements in the bargaining
process. '47
Joyce Najita and Helen Tanimoto of the University of Hawaii
conclude:
[T]he final-offer process works to increase the incentive to bargain by
posing the possibility of an unfavorable arbitrator's decision. The
availability of arbitration at the request of either party helps the
weaker party, and the stronger party is forced to take bargaining
more seriously. The process facilitates the collective bargaining pro-
cess by narrowing the gap between the parties on issues through
maintenance of the flow of communications (hearing, tripartite
panel, timing of offer) and the possibility of remand to negotiations
at the discretion of the arbitration panel.48
My friends in Wisconsin tell me that they like their package v
package system.49
If there is to be arbitration, what is wrong with an arbitrator "im-
posing his/her version of desirable compromises upon the parties?"
This is what conventional arbitration is all about. It has been my expe-
rience that often the "bargain" should be somewhere between the last
offers of the parties. Indeed, I have been concerned in some cases over
the necessity of selecting one of the parties' last offers.
The first last-offer arbitrations which I am aware of were held in
Indianapolis, Indiana, and Eugene, Oregon. Both were package v
package. The arbitrators were not happy with the process.50
I have had only one experience with package v package arbitra-
46, Id. at 169.
47. Id. at 172.
48. Najita and Tanimoto, Interest Disputes Resolution: Final-Offer Arbitration, INDUS. REL.
CENTER, U. OF HAWAII (Jan. 1975). Others have recognized the value of final offer arbitration.
The Act 312 Experience. An Answer to Proposalsfor Amendment 8 (Police Officers Ass'n of Mich.
1980); Stem, Final Offer Arbitration-Initial Experience in Wisconsin, 97 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 40
(Sept. 1974). Wisconsin now has med-arb for nonuniformed employees.
49. But as with all labor laws, there have been "problems." Fleischli, Some Problems with the
Administration of Compulsory Final Offer Arbitration Procedure, 56 CHi-KENT L. REV. 559 (1980).
50. Long and Feuille, Final Offer Arbitration, Sudden Death in Eugene, 27 INDUS. AND LAB.
REL. REV. No. 2, 186 (Jan. 1974); Whitney, Final Offer Arbitration: The Indianapolis Experience,
96 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 20 (May 1973). The opinion of the chairman of the first Eugene arbitra-
tion stated that under conventional arbitration procedures, the majority of the arbitration board
would have adopted the labor organization's proposal after eliminating some clauses. 451 BNA
Gov't Employees Report F-I.
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tion. It was a Michigan school district case in which the school board
and teachers association chose three neutrals.5' We were forced to
choose one of the packages. We stated in our opinion that we disliked
doing so, and pointed to one item which we thought should have been
awarded to the other party.
STATUTORY STANDARDS
Most of the state statutes include standards to be followed by the
arbitrator or panel.52
Standards perform three significant functions:
(1) They have been the basis for upholding the constitutional-
ity of statutes, although some courts have not been deterred by the
lack of standards. 53
(2) Standards have a role in states which provide for appeal of
an arbitration award, as Michigan does. Unless the opinion discloses
that the arbitration panel has considered the statutory standards, the
award will be reversed.54
(3) The presence of standards discloses to advocates the areas
they must consider in preparation-called by the late Arthur Van-
derbilt, Chief Justice of New Jersey, "the persistent drudgery" of
litigation.5 5
Some state statutes provide for an appeal to a court; 56 other states'
statutes do not.57
The Michigan statute requires that the award is to be supported by
"competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record."
(MSA 423; MCLA 242)
Interest arbitration has such a significant role in determination of
government policy and economics that statutes should provide an ap-
51. The other two were Ronald Haughton, member and former chairman of the Federal
Labor Relations Authority, and James McCormick, one-time MERC Administrative Law Judge
and now a Michigan District Judge.
52. Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island (in three of six statutes), Texas, Vermont, Washington,
and Wiscc.nsin.
53. E.g., City of Laramie, supra note 26, and Harney, supra note 26. The standards were one
reason for the Michigan Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of the statute in City of
Detroit, supra note 26.
54. City of Detroit, supra note 26.
55. GERHART, ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT: THE COMPLEAT COUNSELOR 41 (1980).
56. States where there are affirmative statements that an arbitration award may be appealed
are: Alaska, Connecticut (to the legislative body in two of three statutes), Illinois, Michigan, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island (three of five statutes), Texas, Vermont, Washington.
57. The Oregon statute does not include an appeal provision. But as an award must be
supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, it would appear that appeal may be
possible.
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peal on the same basis as the Michigan statute.58
THE ILLINOIS STATUTES
The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, which covers public em-
ployees, except education employees (who are subject to the Illinois
Education Labor Relations Act), and local police and fire fighters, pro-
vides for arbitration of collective bargaining impasses in units of secur-
ity employees, state peace officers, state fire fighters, and employees
whose work is sufficiently essential so that a strike, as determined by a
circuit court, would "constitute a clear and present danger to the health
and safety of the public."
Unless the parties adopt a contrary procedure, arbitration is con-
ducted by a tripartite arbitration panel, one delegate selected by each of
the parties and a chairman chosen from a roster of seven persons fur-
nished by the Board.59
Economic issues, as determined by the panel, are subject to last
offer issue by issue, the offers to be submitted "at or before" the conclu-
sion of the hearing. Noneconomic issues are determined by conven-
tional arbitration.
The Illinois Act includes time tables for the initiation of mediation
and of arbitration, selection of delegates and the chairman, the date of
the hearing, the completion of the hearing, and the issuance of the
award.
If Illinois' experience is similar to that of Michigan, the time limits
will be meaningless. This was my experience as administrator of the
Michigan Police/Fire Fighter Arbitration Act and as a panel chairman
in both police and fire fighter cases. I have learned in my 31 years as
an arbitrator, the difficulty of finding hearing dates satisfactory to law-
yers-or non-lawyer representatives of employers and unions.
The Illinois statute includes "factors" upon which awards shall be
based.
Panel awards are reviewable by a circuit court, but only on the
grounds for review of rights arbitration awards. The statute, unlike the
58. More grievance awards are being appealed because of the important role of rights arbi-
tration in the private sector and in the determination of policy in the public sector. This is as it
should be, some arbitrators to the contrary notwithstanding. The courts have--as they should-
exercised their review power with restraint.
59. There are two labor relations boards: The Illinois State Labor Relations Board has juris-
diction over governmental units with a population not in excess of 1,000,000 and over the Re-
gional Transportation Authority and its employees; the Illinois Local Labor Relations Board has
jurisdiction in government units in excess of 1,000,000 persons, i.e., the City of Chicago and Cook
County.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
Michigan statute and some other arbitration statutes, does not require
that the award be supported by competent, material, and substantial
evidence on the whole record.
I repeat, the significant role of arbitration in determining govern-
ment policy and economics renders court review on evidence desirable.
In the case of a frivolous appeal, the appellant may be required by
the court to pay reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the successful
party. This is a new concept in the statutes, and a good one.
Increases in the rate of compensation may be made retroactive to
the beginning of a fiscal year which commenced after the initiation of
arbitration proceedings.
Quaere: Is an award final? Under the statute, a governing body
may review each "term" awarded by a panel, and if it "fails to accept
or reject one or more terms of the arbitration panel's decision," such
term or terms shall become part of the collective bargaining contract.
However, if the governing body "affirmatively" rejects one or more
terms of the arbitration panel's decision, the statute requires that the
parties "return to the arbitration panel for further proceedings and is-
suance of a supplemental decision with respect to the rejected terms."
Any supplemental decision by the panel is resubmitted to the gov-
erning body.
If there is a second rejection, the parties must again return to the
panel for further proceedings and the issuance of a supplemental deci-
sion. The statute does not state that the second supplemental decision
is binding on the parties.
If the governing body may review and reject, of what value is an
appeal to a circuit court? Litigation seems certain!
The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act does not mandate
arbitration, but authorizes employers and unions to agree to final and
binding impartial arbitration of unresolved issues.
THE FEDERAL SECTOR
A form of interest arbitration exists in the federal sector. As stated
above, collective bargaining for federal employees started with Execu-
tive Order 10988. Not only was the scope of bargaining narrow, but
there was no procedure for administration of the order. In 1967, Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson appointed a committee to study and recommend
changes. The recommended changes, included in a report issued in
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early 1969,60 were incorporated by President Richard Nixon in Execu-
tive Order 11491, dated October 29, 1969.
The order established a Federal Labor Relations Council to ad-
minister and interpret the order, and a Federal Service Impasses Panel
(FSIP), consisting of at least seven part-time individuals appointed by
the President to take such action as was necessary to resolve collective
bargaining impasses.61 Executive Order 11491 was revised on August
26, 1971, by Executive Order 11616.62
In addition, President Nixon issued Executive Order 11636, appli-
able to the three Foreign Service agencies: Department of State,
United States Information Agency, and the Agency for Industrial De-
velopment. The Foreign Service Impasse Disputes Panel (FSIDP) ad-
ministers the Order.
In 1978 Congress enacted the Civil Service Reform Act.63 Title
VII of the Act involves federal sector labor relations. Title VII re-
placed the Federal Labor Relations Council with the Federal Labor
Relations Authority, a three-member agency having power similar to
the powers exercised by the National Labor Relations Board in the pri-
vate sector. FSIP was continued. Under the Foreign Service Reform
Act of 1980, FSIDP became statutory.64
Section 7119 of CSRA provides that if voluntary arrangements be-
tween agencies of the federal government and unions representing fed-
eral employees, following the services of the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service or other third party mediation, fail to resolve a
negotiation impasse, either party may request FSIP for assistance.
Title VII vests broad powers in FSIP. FSIP may recommend to
the parties procedures for the resolution of the impasse; or may assist
the parties in resolving the impasse through "whatever methods and
procedures, including fact finding and recommendations, it may con-
sider appropriate to accomplish the purpose of (the law)."
This power, which was also included in the Executive Order, has
been interpreted by FSIP to include ordering the inclusion of provi-
60. Report of the President's Review Committee on Employee-Management Relations in the
Federal Service, 280 GERR Special Supplement A-I (1969).
61. Presidents have limited membership to seven since FSIP was first established. For experi-
ence under the Executive Order, see Howlett, The Duty to Bargain in the Federal Government,
LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 115 (ABA 1977).
62. E.O. 11491 as amended is quoted in a note at 5 USC 7101, Legislative History of 5 USC
§ 7101, and the court cases construing the order are summarized.
63. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101 et seq (1982).
64. 94 Stat. 2071 (1980).
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sions in contracts. 65 This interpretation of the order and statute has
never been challenged. An order by FSIP is binding arbitration.
Under Executive Order 11491, FSIP generally issued recommen-
dations which in most cases were followed by the federal agency and
federal sector unions.
Since 1981, due in part to reduction of FSIP's budget, it has been
impossible for FSIP to send a professional staff representative to the
locale of every impasse. Instead, FSIP has found it necessary to direct
parties to submit the impasses in writing. This procedure reduced sig-
nificantly the number of settlements, and consequently, there was a
substantial increase in orders issued by FSIP. From 1970 to 1978, 75
orders (six percent of closed cases) were issued; under the statute, there
have been 193 orders (29 percent of closed cases) issued.
In addition to issuing orders, FSIP has directed agencies and un-
ions to outside arbitration, or has assigned a member or professional
staff person of FSIP to serve as arbitrator or to engage in
arbitration/mediation.
The parties may agree to outside arbitration, although the ap-
proval of FSIP is required for this dispute resolving procedure. 66
WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF INTEREST ARBITRATION?
In my opinion, interest arbitration is the civilized procedure for
the resolution of all collective bargaining impasses. Everyone knows
the reasons that the strike-and in some cases the lockout-became the
vehicle for resolving collective bargaining contracts. During the last
half of the 19th century and the first third of the 20th century, the only
means (with few exceptions) by which employees could secure the com-
pensation and working condition to which they believed they were enti-
tled-and in more cases than not, were entitled-was through
collective action, generally in the form of a strike.
In a world where a significant percentage of the human race does
not have enough to eat and adequate places to live, any diminution of
the production of goods and services borders on the immoral.
In this country when there is a controversy or impasse between
individuals or enterprises, the controversy is resolved through a judicial
or quasi-judicial procedure. Labor disputes involving representation
65. FSIDP has similar power.
66. Seegeneraly ROBINSON, NEGOTIABILITY IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR (1980); Nesbitt, supra
note 1.
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issues and unfair labor practices are submitted to such procedures. It is
only in collective bargaining that resolution is through trial by combat.
Should not we, in this country, have become sufficiently civilized
so that collective bargaining impasses, in both the public and private
sectors, are to be settled by judicial or quasi-judicial procedures rather
than through trial by combat?

